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INTRODUCTION
T
he equity versus efficiency argument
has been the bread and butter of eco-
nomic policy and social policy discus-
sions since the emergence of the modern
welfare state in the post-Second World War
period. In virtually all aspects of policy, the
twin goal of promoting economic progress
and promoting social justice stands as a hall-
mark of the modern industrial democracy. By
the late 1960s the general view was that a
conﬂict existed between the efficiency objec-
tive and the equity objective, nicely summa-
rized in Okun’s famous 1975 book, Equality
and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff.
1 In the 1990s
a new debate has emerged covering similar,
although conceptually different, ground.
Productivity growth is widely regarded as
the major long-run determinant of per capi-
ta income growth in industrial countries.
Over the last two decades, economists have
been preoccupied with understanding the
sources of productivity growth, and slow pro-
ductivity growth in Canada has been a major
policy concern for several years. Prior to the
mid-1980s, traditional economic analysis
focused on the static effects of economic pol-
icy — the so-called size-of-the-pie effects.
For example, when looking at the impact of
taxes on labour supply, the analysis was con-
cerned with the one-time effect an increase
in wage taxes could have on the labour sup-
ply, rather than its effect on long-run eco-
nomic growth. However, it is evident that,
in the longer term, how fast the pie grows is
more important. The reason is simple: a
small change in long-term growth rates —
on the order of 1.0 percent, or even less —
has dramatically larger consequences than a
similar percentage change in GDP. This
explains the emphasis put, in both research
and policy, on understanding the factors
leading to higher, or lower, productivity
growth, as opposed to other factors that do
not have permanent consequences on growth.
Social policy might well be one factor that
has an impact on growth. The expansion of
the welfare state was heavily dependent on
strong economic growth in the 1950s and
1960s. The ﬁscal repercussions of slow pro-
ductivity growth, which had set in by the
mid-1970s and were evident in a debt and
deﬁcit build-up by the mid-1980s, raised
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social spending. For both of these reasons, the
dynamics of social policy became inevitably
linked with the issue of economic growth.
That growth depends on productivity is
not a fact in serious dispute; but the long-run
sources, or ultimate determinants, of produc-
tivity growth are not completely understood.
At the most general level, this is Adam
Smith’s question: What are the sources of the
wealth of nations? At a more restricted level,
there is agreement on the proximate sources
of productivity growth — new investment,
human capital formation, new technology and
product innovation. What drives these factors
in an economy has been accounted for largely
by economic determinants — that is, those
impinging directly on investment, innovation,
education and trade, which appear to have a
direct and medium-term impact on produc-
tivity growth. However, recent research has
put forward the hypothesis that social factors
may also be a major determinant of produc-
tivity growth. Social factors would include the
distribution of income and wealth in an econ-
omy, the range of social policy interventions
including health, education, labour market
regulation and a variety of income support
programs. These social policies may be deﬁned
to include the tax-transfer system, which
ﬁnances the social budget. The implications
of this change of perspective are potentially
quite powerful in making a case for social pol-
icy. If it could be established that social
determinants are a quantitatively major factor
in productivity growth, then the traditional
efficiency-equity tradeoff may not exist. Social
policies to promote equity could also be
defended on grounds that they simultaneous-
ly increase economic growth. The tradeoff is
replaced by a virtuous circle in which equity-
enhancing policies also promote economic
growth. This paper provides a critical evalua-
tion of these arguments.
The paper present a survey of the evi-
dence and debate on the social determinants
of productivity in the context of the
Canadian productivity debate. It examines
both the basic theoretical arguments and the
evidence advanced by economists, and their
relationship to what might be called modern
social policy. Not all social policy is directly
motivated by equity considerations. In par-
ticular, modern social policies in the area of
education and health focused on promoting
the growth of human capital represent one
category where both the evidence and debate
on the growth effects are qualitatively differ-
ent from those in other areas of social policy.
It is instructive to consider the context
in which this often heated, and at times polit-
ically loaded, debate surrounding the impact
of social policy on economic growth has taken
place. Three trends have been driving the
wider debate in industrial countries — all of
which are noticeable in Canada. First, the slow
growth in Europe, particularly of employ-
ment, had led many to put the blame on the
welfare state.
2 "Eurosclerosis" became the term
employed to describe the slow growth and poor
employment record of a number of European
countries through the 1980s and early 1990s.
A parallel debate in the Scandinavian countries
has led many to the conclusion that the
Scandinavian welfare state had similar conse-
quences. Assar Lindbeck’s critique is one of
the most well-known (see Lindbeck 1975,
1995). Part of the European record was the
perception that generous social programs were
a major factor responsible for the poor growth
record. This debate was fuelled in part by the
famous OECD Jobs Study (1994) and an attack
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debt and deﬁcits in the mid-1990s. It may
well be that the factors behind the slow
employment growth in Europe ultimately
have little to do with long-term productivity
growth; but in the popular debate, the
impacts of the European welfare state on pro-
ductivity, employment and ﬁscal policy tend
to get lumped together. Canada is typically
viewed as somewhere between the United
States and Europe on the welfare state spec-
trum, so that these arguments have likewise
played out here.
A second major element, of more recent
origin, is the debate on the “new economy”
in the United States in contrast with the slow
growth in Europe. The long and extraordi-
nary economic expansion in the United States
throughout the 1990s was accompanied by
high employment and strong productivity
growth. While the sources of this growth
remain a matter of discussion, the new econ-
omy hypothesis claims that it is driven by the
impact of innovations in the information,
communications and telecommunications
ﬁelds, giving rise to an entirely new phase of
economic development — the so-called Third
Industrial Revolution. Prior to the recent
surge in growth, beginning in the mid- to
late-1970s but continuing into the 1980s,
there was a signiﬁcant rise in market income
inequality in the United States and the
United Kingdom. These trends have subse-
quently shown up in most OECD countries,
including Canada, but in Europe particular-
ly it appeared that inequality was not increas-
ing to the same degree. The acceleration of
growth in the United States during the 1990s
led some to infer that inequality contributed
to growth. The divergent US and European
growth patterns in the 1990s have brought
the charge that the redistributive and labour-
market policies responsible for Eurosclerosis
have also prevented Europe from experienc-
ing the growth beneﬁts of the new economy.
Economic growth and the preservation of
equality as seen through this debate appear to
be conﬂicting goals, reinforcing the old view
that equity and growth are in opposition with
one another.
Thirdly, an intellectual challenge to the
existence of an equity-efficiency tradeoff emerged
at about the time that the Eurosclerosis debate
began. In the mid-1980s economists began to
seriously rethink the sources of economic growth,
which led to both the New Growth Theory
3and
a large empirical literature on the determinants
of growth and productivity. The development
of new data sets for a large number of develop-
ing and developed countries allowed researchers
to pose new and interesting questions about the
sources of growth. Much if not all of the intel-
lectual impetus to discover links between social
factors and growth is found in this literature on
cross-country growth comparisons. In the early
1990s a number of researchers identiﬁed a
robust negative empirical correlation between
measures of inequality and economic growth
— lower inequality would be associated with
higher growth. Other researchers began to look
for other policy determinants of growth, many
of which bear directly or indirectly on the issue
of social policy, such as education and ﬁscal pol-
icy. Lastly, a voluminous literature has emerged
on the rising wage inequality in advanced
industrial countries over the last two decades.
While not directly about productivity and
social policy, the wage inequality issue ﬁgures
prominently in the productivity-social policy
debate, for a simple reason. Much of this litera-
ture adopts the opposite perspective — what is
driving inequality is economic growth, which
281
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this perspective, understanding the conse-
quences of any policy intervention on inequal-
ity and growth requires an understanding of the
complex interaction between technological
change and productivity growth, and its impli-
cations for wages and employment.
My purpose in this paper is to try to
make sense of these often seemingly contra-
dictory pieces of theory and evidence linking
social policy to economic growth. Essentially
the paper looks at two areas of research: the
growth and inequality debate, and the small
but growing literature on the policy deter-
minants of economic growth. To provide the
context for this discussion, the paper also
includes some background material on eco-
nomic growth, productivity and social policy
in OECD countries.
4
By way of a caveat, the paper is focused
speciﬁcally on issues that are pertinent to
Canada, or at least to countries like Canada —
those with a democratic, high-income, small,
open OECD economy. Nothing in what fol-
lows is meant to prescribe what development
strategies are, or are not, appropriate for the
developing world. The paper does not discuss
the other main objectives of social policy that
are not directly related to growth. Lastly, the
paper does not discuss two areas of social pol-
icy that do have growth effects but are not
directly related to the productivity issue.
These are: the effects of social security reform
on savings — a very active debate driven by
the aging population issue; and the effects of
labourmarket regulation on employment,
which have been extensively discussed since
the release of the OECD Jobs Study.
5
My main conclusion is in the form of a
non-conclusion. This is one case where strong
policy conclusions are well ahead of both the-
ory and evidence. Neither provides conclu-
sive support for the proposition that either
(a) policies directed at reducing inequality will
increase productivity growth, or (b) increased
social spending will raise productivity growth.
Both advocates and opponents of such policies
will ﬁnd little comfort in these conclusions:
advocates, for the obvious reason that they are
left in the position of dealing with the charge
that equity and efficiency are often conﬂict-
ing goals; opponents, because the evidence is
often sufficiently indecisive to leave ample
room for a priori reasoned arguments to the
contrary. Lastly, it should be stressed that
most of the research is relatively recent. It is
entirely possible that the balance of evidence








Economic growth is measured as an
increase in real economic output per person
at the national level and is generally regard-
ed as reﬂecting four factors:
> capital accumulation
> employment growth relative to popu-
lation growth
> external market factors
> productivity growth
Of these four factors, productivity growth
has generally been found the most important
for industrial countries. However, all the other
factors can play an important role at various
times. For example, a sudden increase in the
fraction of the population that is employed
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few years. Moreover, a strict additive decompo-
sition of these four factors could easily lead to
incorrect inferences as to what is driving
growth. For example, an increase in productiv-
ity growth caused by the availability of new
technologies can lead to greater investment,
which has an additional knock-on effect on the
growth rate. Causality can also run the other
way — investment can carry spillover effects
through improved knowledge ﬂows, leading to
higher productivity.
The productivity of an economic activity
is deﬁned by economists as the ratio of an
index of outputs to an index of inputs. It can
be deﬁned at the level of an individual per-
forming a certain task, a plant producing a
particular good, a ﬁrm carrying out a diverse
set of economic activities, an industry, or an
entire country. Productivity goes up when
you can get more output with the same
inputs. The deﬁnition of productivity hinges
critically upon how one measures the inputs
and the outputs. In the economic literature,
the starting point is a production function
depicting a microeconomic relationship at a
point in time and mapping input to outputs.
So we write, for example:
Y=AF(K,L)
where Y is output, K and L are measures of
capital and labour, F(K,L) is a time-invariant
functional relationship between capital and
labour, and A is a time-varying parameter,
referred to as an efficiency parameter or total
factor productivity (TFP) parameter. The pro-
ductivity level is deﬁned as the output per
unit of labour input — the average labour
productivity — either per worker or per hour
worked, deﬁned as Y/L. In this framework,
productivity growth is the sum of two effects:
the increase in the TFP parameter A, and the
increase in capital per worker K/L. This
approach is extremely well-known and is used
at both the individual micro-unit level and the
level of the entire economy.
7 In the latter case,
output is measured as real GDP and L is either
the working population or the total number
of hours worked. At the macro level, A is also
referred to as the stock of knowledge, in line with
the recent emphasis on knowledge as the truly
ultimate determinant of technological feasi-
bility. In practice, growth in A is invariably
done by attributing to it what other factors
cannot explain. In macroeconomics, this is
often referred to as the Solow residual. For
most industrial countries, growth in labour
productivity is accounted for by changes in A,
while relatively little growth is accounted for
by changes in capital per unit of labour.
However, the range of estimates varies
considerably.
8
While this framework is conceptually
simple and widely used because productivity
growth can be identiﬁed by the residual
method (i.e., the change in A calculated by
subtracting from the growth in Y a weighted
average of the growth in K and L), it has long
been recognized that this approach presents
some serious shortcomings. In particular, there
is no institutional context describing how eco-
nomic incentives are determined, where new
technology comes from, or what factors deter-
mine investment. The major accounts of the
Industrial Revolution or of economic devel-
opment offered by economic historians place
great emphasis on these last factors.
9
A more general diagram depicting the
determinants of productivity growth is given
in Figure 1, which distinguishes between three
interrelated categories — the economic deter-
minants of productivity, the social determi-
nants of productivity, and the policy and
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interact. The arrows indicate the possible
directions of causality running between the
three sets of interrelated factors. It is conven-
tional to distinguish between the direct effect
and the indirect or feedback effect each of
these variables has on each other. It is gener-
ally agreed that investment, particularly in
machinery and equipment, has the most direct
measured impact on business sector produc-
tivity. This shows up in both country micro-
studies and cross-country studies. Many social
determinants could have an impact on pro-
ductivity growth through their effect on
investment. For example, greater political sta-
bility contributes to investment growth by
reducing uncertainty; this greater investment
in turn raises productivity growth, which
leads to high economic growth. More gener-
ally, government policies — economic and
social — probably have some medium-term
effect on productivity growth via their impact
on the economic determinants of productivi-
ty growth, such as investment. However, both
economic and social policy also impact on the
social determinants of productivity growth.
For example, education policy affects both the
average level of human capital in the economy
and the longer-run wage distribution between
skilled and unskilled workers, which in turn
affects future investments in human capital.
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of institutional and policy factors. Greater
income inequality can inﬂuence political deci-
sions on social policy, for example, which
would have second-round effects on growth
and inequality, and so on. For the purposes of
this paper, these highly indirect factors will be
mentioned only occasionally, largely because
there is not a lot of evidence in the literature.
However, they certainly ﬁgure prominently in
the larger debate on the sources of differences
in national economic performance.
10
One of the major problems affecting
research on the deeper causal pathways run-
ning from policy to growth is the time frame
involved. Tax policy changes are likely to
affect investment next year; education policy
reforms may not change the stock of human
capital in the economy for years to come. This
time-horizon problem has forced researchers
to use empirical data and methods that are
capable of identifying medium-term measur-
able linkages between particular inputs and
economic growth. Much of the cross-country
research, for example, tries to identify the
long-term effect of policy on growth by using
averages of long-term growth rates over long
periods, often two or more decades, and sam-
ples of countries with vastly different levels
of economic development. The difficulty with
this approach is that one is forced to assume
that the effect of a given variable on growth
is the same for all countries, thus ignoring
potentially signiﬁcant differences between
countries in the way a given policy or social
factor might impinge on growth.
As discussed in a companion paper to
this (Harris 1999), the bulk of the micro evi-
dence on productivity is primarily about the
so-called economic determinants. This reﬂects
both data availability and the fact that eco-
nomic theories linking these factors to pro-
ductivity growth have received a lot more
attention from economists than potential
social determinants. We now turn to a
description of where this evidence stands, and
a review of recent trends in social policy.
Economic Determinants of 
Productivity
The bulk of the productivity literature
is concerned with either (a) measuring pro-
ductivity, or (b) attempting to assess the
quantitative importance of a set of limited
economic determinants, largely at the micro-
economic level but also at the macroeconom-
ic level. The determinants that have received
the most attention are investment, human cap-
ital, innovation and diffusion of technology,
effects of international and domestic competi-
tion, various forms of knowledge spillovers,
and most recently geographic agglomeration
of economic activity. The success of these
explanations has varied. Beyond the ﬁrst four
explanations, the measured effects are high-
ly variable and in many cases difficult to
detect statistically.
The social policy-inequality-growth
debate has been partially motivated by and
conducted almost entirely within a macro-
economic framework focused on national
comparisons. This is not surprising since dif-
ferences in social determinants are generally
regarded as having systemic economy-wide
effects that would tend to impact on all sec-
tors of the economy. The search for empiri-
cal regularities has therefore largely focused
on differences between economies, averaged
over a number of years. Attributing differ-
ences in productivity growth across time
within a national economy to a single policy
is fraught with difficulty. In particular, the
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trend together makes it impossible to prove
the importance of one particular factor rela-
tive to any number of others. The most
prevalent form of evidence that has been
offered in the modern debate, therefore, is
either reduced-form or structural growth
equations in which the explanatory variable
is the average growth of GDP per worker, or
per hour, across a number of countries.
Researchers in this area are well aware of the
possible complex causal relations linking
these variables at the aggregate level. Success
may thus be judged by the standard scientif-
ic criteria of demonstrating that a few vari-
ables explain the data fairly well, or that
particular variables show up repeatedly as
quantitatively signiﬁcant, despite variations
in the data or statistical methods used. So far,
it has been difficult to show that the eco-
nomic determinants do a fairly good job in
explaining the growth experience of countries
at all levels of economic development.
Using a full sample of countries at all
stages of development and only a limited set of
economic variables leaves a lot to be explained.
In discussing this issue, Hall and Jones (1999)
point out that vast differences in income levels
cannot be explained by savings behaviour or
even measured human capital levels:
Output per worker in the ﬁve countries with
the highest levels of output per worker in
1988 was 31.7 times higher than output per
worker in the ﬁve lowest countries (based on
a geometric average). Relatively little of this
difference was due to physical and human
capital: differences in capital intensity and
human capital per worker contributed factors
of 1.8 and 2.2, respectively, to the difference
in output per worker. Productivity, however,
contributed a factor of 8.3 to this difference:
with no difference in productivity, output per
worker in the ﬁve richest countries would have
been only about four times larger than in the
ﬁve poorest countries. In this sense, differences
in physical capital and educational attain-
ment explain only a modest amount of the
difference in output per worker across coun-
tries. (92)
International productivity differences (in
levels) are enormous and any coherent expla-
nation will have to rely on institutional and
social infrastructure factors. The relevance of
this to the OECD countries — many have very
similar levels of economic development and
quite similar institutional structures — is
questionable. For these countries, similarities
in institutions and developmental stages imply
that the sources of growth are more likely to
be found in a common set of factors. Most eco-
nomic theories simply assume the problem
away. Contemporary growth theory largely
assumes a well-functioning market system
with efficient ﬁnancial markets, and markets
that clear (most of the time) for labour and cap-
ital. Are these theories — now textbook mate-
rial for most graduate students — capable of
describing the modern economic growth expe-
rience of advanced countries? The answer is not
a decisive yes or no, but, as we will see below,
the support for these models in the case of
industrial countries is fairly good. In general,
however, the task they face is considerably less
daunting than it is for models attempting to
explain what Hall and Jones describe, given
that the maximum difference in income levels
can be expressed as factors of 2 to 3.
Growth theory and empirical work
have made some progress in the last decade
toward reducing the uncertainty surround-
ing the determinants of growth in industri-
al countries. Temple (1999), for example, is
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the literature. I would summarize the evi-
dence on modern empirical growth models
as involving three stages — the reduced-form
literature, and then the structural models of
growth without and with explicit transition-
al dynamics.
First, in the cross-sectional reduced-
form literature, there is a consensus that rel-
atively few variables are statistically robust
in a growth equation (see Levine and Renelt
1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997). In a growth equa-
tion, average labour-productivity growth is
the dependent variable with a set of poten-
tial explanatory variables on the right-hand
side. The successful variables include:
> the initial income level at the begin-




> indicators of openness in trade and/or
foreign direct investment (FDI)
Temple (2000) surveys this literature
and notes that, given the lack of an explicit
theoretical structure, a large number of vari-
ables have been tried and the whole literature
suffers heavily from data mining. That said,
the growth regression literature has been very
inﬂuential, although more so with respect to
developing country issues than advanced
country issues. The early work also revealed
a number of variables that, to some, were not
good explainers of growth. These included
ﬁscal policy, R&D measures, and various
political and legal variables.
Second, an important structural model
of growth is the Mankiw-Romer-Weil (1992)
augmented Solow model. This is the basic
neoclassical growth model of Robert Solow
with exogenous savings in physical capital, to
which is added a third factor input — human
capital. This is all done within a constant
returns to scale aggregate production frame-
work. The model is empirically implemented
by imposing a steady-state restriction which
implies that countries are on a steady-state
long-run growth path for the period exam-
ined. Under this assumption, growth rates
(the dependent variable) can be expressed
without reference to the stocks of physical or
human capital, but as functions of the savings
rate, a schooling variable, and an initial pro-
ductivity level assumed to be randomly dis-
tributed across countries. Attempts to make
this model ﬁt OECD cross-sectional data have
not met with much success. This can be
regarded as either a failure of the theory or a
reﬂection of the fact that the steady-state
restriction is too constraining.
11
Third, the 1990s have brought a variety
of structural growth models that incorporate
human capital and drop the assumption that
observed growth is of the steady-state kind. By
incorporating dynamic transition effects to
allow theoretical growth rates to vary over
time, the models have met with somewhat
more success. Barro (1991) was an early pioneer
in this area, but numerous methodological,
measurement and econometric improvements
have been made over the last decade. A good
technical survey of this literature is provided by
Durlauf and Quah (1999), and it is covered in
part in the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) text-
book. More signiﬁcantly, the most recent ver-
sions of these models use panel data that
exploit both cross-sectional and time series
variation and are estimated using a variety of
what are referred to as dynamic panel methods.
Initially, there was some debate about the way
in which the human capital variables should
enter the model and some of the early results
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this human capital paradox has recently been
largely resolved. Many of these estimates sup-
port the view of close to non-diminishing
returns to a broad measure of human and non-
human capital. Non-diminishing returns
imply that increases in broad capital per work-
er yield incremental output increases that do
not diminish as more capital is added. This
comes very close to supporting what is known
as endogenous long-run growth. Endogenous
growth, as developed by Romer (1990) and
Lucas (1988), occurs when a policy variable,
such as the savings rate, can have a permanent
effect on the growth rate as opposed to the long-
term level of income. Non-diminishing
returns to capital are a sufficient condition for
a growth model to generate endogenous
growth. A model exhibits exogenous growth
when policy variables have only transitional
effects on growth rates, although they can
impact on steady-state levels of income. The
Mankiw-Romer-Weil model is an example of
an exogenous growth model.
Measurement and data issues have turned
out to be quite important in this literature.
Changes in data on capital stocks, human cap-
ital and speciﬁc economic policy variables have
tended to have a substantial effect on estimat-
ed parameter values (see Temple 1999).
Policy enters these models either as an
additional explanatory variable or as a struc-
tural characteristic of the model. While in
principle one can distinguish between endoge-
nous and exogenous growth models, empiri-
cally identifying the effect of a policy variable
on the steady-state income level versus the
medium-term growth rate has proven to be
very difficult with data sets covering 20 to 30
years. This is simply because convergence in
these models is relatively slow, and when the
share of proﬁt and returns to human capital
becomes large (on the order of 2/3 or greater
for most high-income countries), endogenous
and exogenous growth models begin to behave
qualitatively in a very similar fashion. A lot of
the most recent literature works largely with-
in an augmented Solow framework, in which
policy impacts on the transitional growth rate,
although the effects can last for a couple of
decades. Policy is often discussed in terms of
its impact on the rate of convergence. This refers
to the fact that holding policy constant, these
theories predict income levels that tend to con-
verge to the steady-state income level. The rate
of convergence is deﬁned by reference to how
long the process takes. Typical estimates are in
the range of 15 to 30 years. When an economy
is out of steady-state growth, which is usually
assumed to be the case of interest, changes in
policy impact on the rate of convergence as
well as on the long-run level of income. Other
things being equal, a policy that raises long-
run income and has a shorter period of conver-
gence is preferable to one that has a longer
period of convergence.
12
A recent paper by Bassanini et al.
(2001) provides a good example of the use of
this type of econometric model for a cross-
country analysis of growth in OECD countries
over the 1971-98 period with a speciﬁc
emphasis on economic determinants. The
basic growth model is a dynamic version of
the augmented Solow model discussed in
chapter 5 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
with human capital and R&D. Policy variables
interact with accumulation variables and also
have a potential impact on long-run steady-
state levels of productivity. The model does
not impose similar dynamics on all countries
— rates of convergence are allowed to vary
among countries — but it does assume that in
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ilar parameter values up to a constant level of
difference between countries. The model does
quite well at tracking the data, and the
authors provide an illustrative decomposition
of the factors that determine aggregate pro-
ductivity growth. The set of variables that
explain growth includes a group of baseline
variables (those derived from the basic theory)
and a group of economic policy variables that
shift the growth path:
Baseline variables:
>the initial productivity level









In the estimation of the model, govern-
ment investment turned out to be insigniﬁ-
cant, while the R&D variable had to be
dropped due to limited country coverage,
although both were signiﬁcant on a more lim-
ited data set. Table 1 reports the decomposi-
tion of the growth rate for each country
expressed as a deviation from the OECD aver-
age. Looking at the row for Canada, we see
that the country’s annual growth rate of
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TABLE 1
Economic Determinants of Economic Growth in OECD Countries, 1971–98
Country
Australia 1.68 0.13 -0.37 0.20 0.52 -0.25 0.03 0.01 -0.41 0.40
Austria 1.57 0.02 -0.41 0.07 0.26 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01
Belgium 1.66 0.11 -0.53 0.02 -0.15 0.20 0.03 -0.05 0.53 0.06
Canada 1.32 0.23 -0.90 -0.21 0.62 -0.18 0.04 -0.07 0.14 0.32
Denmark 1.69 0.14 -0.57 0.28 0.21 0.12 0.02 -0.14 -0.05 0.27
Finland 1.82 0.27 0.51 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.00 -0.06 -0.26 -0.14
France 1.35 0.20 -0.59 -0.09 -0.10 0.07 0.07 -0.08 0.05 0.48
Greece 1.15 -0.40 2.00 0.19 -0.56 -0.07 -0.16 0.17 -0.51 -1.48
Ireland 3.02 1.47 1.54 -0.18 -0.32 -0.18 0.01 0.09 0.17 0.34
Italy 1.73 0.18 0.22 -0.13 -0.69 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.14 0.48
Netherlands 1.26 -0.29 -0.47 -0.03 0.25 0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.52 -0.50
New 
Zealand 0.53 -1.02 0.34 -0.17 0.31 -0.29 -0.07 0.10 -0.36 -0.87
Norway 1.72 0.17 -0.12 -0.05 0.35 0.07 0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01
Portugal 2.15 0.60 2.56 0.58 -1.20 0.07 -0.10 0.10 0.11 -1.52
Spain 1.28 -0.27 0.73 0.04 -1.12 0.00 0.03 0.07 -0.14 0.11
Sweden 1.20 -0.35 -0.60 -0.10 0.21 0.11 -0.10 -0.17 0.01 0.30
Switzerland 0.81 -0.74 -1.75 0.08 0.59 -0.04 0.00 0.15 0.02 0.21
United 
Kingdom 1.63 0.08 0.05 -0.21 0.17 0.15 -0.03 -0.02 0.31 -0.34
United 
States 1.93 0.38 -1.62 -0.34 0.63 -0.09 0.07 0.09 -0.25 1.89
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points above the OECD average for the peri-
od. The last column reports the country-
speciﬁc residual effect, which is that part of
the growth differential unexplained by the
model. For Canada, it turns out that 0.32 per-
centage points of growth are unexplained.
Factors that impact on Canada’s growth rela-
tive to the OECD average include:
> a high initial income, which tended to
reduce Canada’s growth relative to
other OECD countries, which started
the period at much lower productivity
levels;
> a share of investment in GDP that was
lower than in other countries;
> human capital levels that account for a
large positive effect on the Canadian
growth differential (0.62 percentage
points per year);
> openness to trade, which accounts for a
positive 0.14-percentage-point growth
differential; and 
> population growth, government con-
sumption levels and inﬂation variabil-
ity, which account for very little of the
growth differential.
The model performs well except for two
countries, Greece and the United States. The
authors note that Greece is an unusual case,
which also raises some data issues. However,
the US results are quite interesting. The large
positive unexplained residual for the United
States reﬂects the inability of the model to
explain the acceleration of labour-productivi-
ty growth in the 1990s. To that extent, it is
clear that the explanation of growth being
offered by this model is less than complete.
Nevertheless, the model provides an impres-
sive example of how far modern theory and
econometric methods can go in terms of
explaining the growth performance of indus-
trial countries. Providing explanations for the
country-speciﬁc effects remains an important
issue. There could be either social determinants
or other unaccounted-for economic determi-
nants at work. It is important to emphasize
that it would appear that a large portion of eco-
nomic growth can be accounted for by a rela-
tively small set of determinants.
Social Policy
The basic policy question to be
addressed is the extent to which social poli-
cy might have consequences for productivi-
ty. As most of the empirical work in the area
hinges on differences among countries in
social policies, this subsection provides a brief
review of some indicators of social policy. In
Canada, social government expenditure cov-
ers a range of public-sector activities. A typ-
ical classiﬁcation scheme based on public
ﬁnance theory would be as follows:
> Public goods and services — pure pub-
lic goods such as national defence and
general public services such as admin-
istration, legislation and regulation.
> Merit goods and services — quasi-pub-
lic goods provided on grounds of mar-
ket failure, externalities or economic
justice principles. For example, govern-
ment provision of education is common
because citizens may ignore the social
returns of human capital investment or
may have limited access to capital mar-
kets. Health care is another example.
> Economic services — private goods or
services prone to natural monopoly or
strong externalities. Examples include
public utilities and ﬁnancial support
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support for income and living stan-
dards that have declined sharply or to
individuals who face exceptional
expenses due to old age, disability,
sickness, unemployment or family cir-
cumstances.
Under this classiﬁcation, social policy
would tend to be deﬁned in terms of spend-
ing under the merit goods and services and social
transfers categories. An alternative perspec-
tive would be focused not on the classiﬁca-
tion of spending, but more directly on the
goals of social policy. Social policy pursues a
number of goals, including:
> increasing self-reliance
> readjusting intergenerational burdens
> improving ﬂexibility and economic
growth
> reducing the incidence of low income
and child poverty
> improving the efficiency and quality of
service delivery
> improving public ﬁnances
> improving social cohesion
> ensuring that basic social needs are met
Clearly, economic growth is one goal,
but only one of many, and almost certainly
not the most important. The recent social
policy debate in many OECD countries tend-
ed to emphasize the cost side of the ledger.
The incentive cost argument emphasizes that
social protection can generate long-term wel-
fare dependency and the capacity for ﬂexible
adjustment to shocks. The funding of social
security contributions in the form of payroll
taxes or general tax revenues increases the dis-
tortionary welfare cost of taxation. High social
security and health-care contribution liabil-
ities for employers and other non-wage
labour costs can lead to lower employment,
especially for low-wage unskilled workers.
All of these factors might contribute to lower
productivity growth.
However, in principle, social programs can
facilitate economic adjustment and thus eco-
nomic growth. For example, unemployment
beneﬁts can provide replacement income while
people search for a job. Social protection provides
collective insurance to cover risks that may occur
during a person’s life (such as unemployment,
sickness, disability, maternity), usually at a much
lower cost than if such risks were insured pri-
vately, leading to increased investments in
human capital and greater mobility. Active
measures to encourage and facilitate labour force
participation contribute to economic growth by
enhancing the ﬂexibility of the labour force.
Policies to improve the health and safety of the
workforce can increase labour productivity.
13
Assessing the productivity effects of
social policy is inherently difficult. Aside from
the direct human capital effects, a lot of the
impact is likely to be indirect, working
through changes in incentives to invest, save
or work or through the induced ﬁscal effects on
similar variables. The search for empirical reg-
ularities linking growth to social policy is
almost non-existent. OECD comparisons are
inevitably going to be the data most discussed
in this respect. To make matters worse, these
comparative data are almost all related to
expenditures — that is, they measure inputs
to social programs but not their outputs, which
would be preferable in a productivity study.
The growth literature has investigated quite
extensively two categories of public spending
— public investment and government con-
sumption. Generally, the results are mildly
favourable toward the productivity or growth
effects of public-sector investment, and dis-
tinctly negative with respect to public-sector
291
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reported in the last subsection. However, nei-
ther of these captures what would be called
various forms of social expenditure. Differences
between countries in social spending is the
only form of evidence available thus far to
estimate the growth effects of social policy.
Under the public ﬁnance classiﬁcation
of spending, Canada tends to spend relatively
little on what might be called public goods or
economic services. Of total public spending, a
great deal is accounted for by social spending.
In 1995, public goods accounted for 2.6 per-
cent of GDP, merit goods (health, education
and other social services) 12.3 percent, income
transfers 11.5 percent, economic services 2.4
percent and interest on the public debt 9.6
percent. However, comparative numbers are
more interesting. Table 2 compares Canada to
two other countries perceived to be at oppo-
site ends of the social policy spectrum with
respect to spending on education, health and
transfers — Sweden and the United States.
While there were substantial differences
among the three countries in 1980, some
convergence has occurred between Canada and
the United States while Sweden continues to
stand out in its spending on social transfers.
Here are some other characteristics of
OECD social spending patterns worth noting:
> A well-established empirical regularity
in public ﬁnance is what is known as
Wagner’s Law. The demand for certain
types of social protection rises more than
proportionately with the level of per
capita income. While this relationship is
not observed in a cross-section of coun-
tries, it holds very strongly in almost
every national time series on public
expenditure. This fact, usually explained
by using simple arguments about voter
preferences, implies that economic
growth is likely to have a positive
impact on social spending, confounding
the detection of causal channels running
in the other direction — from social
spending to economic growth.
> Much of what government does is redis-
tributive (Boadway, 1998), but the
interesting fact is that the bulk of the
redistribution is not from the rich to the
poor. During the 1980s and 1990s the
reforms to the personal tax system in
nearly all OECD countries and the pres-
sure on public budgets meant that the
generosity of beneﬁt schemes was
reduced. While beneﬁt systems redis-
tribute income, they redistribute prima-
rily not from the rich to the poor but,
rather, from the young to the old, from
those who work to those who do not,
and from childless families to families




Selected Social Expenditures as a
Percentage of GDP, Canada, Sweden 
and the United States
1980 1990 1995
Health
Canada 5.0 5.4 5.8
Sweden 8.4 7.6 5.7
United States 4.0 5.2 6.5
Education
Canada 5.4 6.7 6.5
Sweden 7.6 6.8 6.6
United States 5.3 5.3 5.0
Transfers
Canada 8.1 10.8 11.5
Sweden 16.5 19.2 21.2
United States 9.3 8.5 9.4
Source: OECD (2000).
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and its growth effects are dependent on
the details of speciﬁc programs.
> There has been a general and persist-
ent upward trend in total government
spending within OECD countries.
From 1970 to 2000, the OECD aver-
age went from 29.2 percent to 36.5
percent of GDP. Canada went from
33.8 percent in 1970 to 46 percent in
1990, and then down to 37.8 percent
in 2000 with the successive Martin
budgets. The major factor to which
most analysts attribute this growth is
the creation and expansion of pro-
grams and the provision of services in
the social policy area. The income
support element of these entitlements
is reﬂected in a persistent rise in
income transfer payments until the
mid-1990s.
The common social policy experience
of so many countries points to the difficulty
inherent in attempting to use these variables
to explain differences in the growth experi-
ences within OECD countries. However,
there are some notable differences, as noted
above, and these will prove important in the
identiﬁcation of the effects of social expendi-
tures on productivity.
INEQUALITY, SOCIAL POLICY 
AND PRODUCTIVITY
In this section we review the theoretical
and empirical literature that points to a causal
linkage running from inequality and social
policy to productivity growth. It is instructive
ﬁrst to assess what has been a key driving force
behind the policy dimension of this debate —
the recent changes in income inequality.
Looking at the total income of the working
population, the changes have not been as dra-
matic as one might imagine from the popular
debate on this topic. In Table 3, the levels and
changes of two standard inequality indexes,
the Gini coefficient and the ratio of income of
the 90th decile to the 10th decile are record-
ed.
14 It is well-known that total income
inequality rose in the United States and the
United Kingdom from the mid-1970s
through the mid-1980s. These trends were
never as evident in other countries. However,
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TABLE 3
Inequality Levels and Changes, Working-age Population, Mid-1970s to Mid-1990s
Levels Absolute Changes Between Periods
P90/P10 P90/P10 P90/P10
Gini Decile Gini Gini Decile Decile
Coefficient Ratio Coefficient Coefficient Ratio Ratio
mid-70s /  mid-80s / mid-70s / mid-80s /
mid-90s mid-90s mid-80s mid-90s mid-80s mid-90s
Canada 28.7 3.9 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0
Sweden 24.7 3.1 -0.6 2.3 0.0 0.2
United Kingdom 30.4 4.1 3.7 2.7 0.7 0.4
United States 33.3 5.3 2.9 0.6 1.0 -0.1
Source: Förster and Pellizzari (2000).
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what. The effects on the distribution of
income for the working-age population are
shown for four countries: Canada, the United
Kingdom, the United States and Sweden.
While the level of inequality of income with-
in the working-age population would be con-
sidered higher in Canada than in Sweden,
there has been virtually no change from the
mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. However, with
respect to market income, the underlying
trend has been similar in most countries. A
recent OECD summary of the trends with
respect to Canada is provided in Box 1.
What has happened in Canada is typi-
cal of a number of OECD countries: from the
1980s to the mid-1990s there was a fairly
signiﬁcant change in the distribution of mar-
ket income towards the upper end of the dis-
tribution despite the relatively mild changes
in total inequality, which measures income
after taxes and transfers.
15 Speciﬁcally for
Canada, from 1988 to 1995, changes record-
ed in the market income share of different
deciles are presented in Table 4.
There is little doubt that these data have
been a major factor behind the renewed inter-
est in growth and inequality. Speciﬁcally, it is
being argued that there is a causal chain run-
ning in the following sequence:
Social policy ➾ Income
inequality ➾ Economic growth
with the presumption that increased income
inequality lowers growth. The debate was
given a great deal of impetus by two related
developments in the ﬁeld of economic
growth: ﬁrst, an empirical ﬁnding that
claimed to show a positive link between lower
inequality and higher growth, based on cross-
sectional growth regressions; second, some
theoretical work in the new growth theory tra-
dition that provided a rationale for this link.
In this section, we look at both developments.
Finally, it should be pointed out that it has
long been recognized that causal links could
also run the other way — from growth to
inequality — although the sign of the effect
is largely viewed as ambiguous. In the broad
sweep of evidence on the Industrial
Revolution and economic development, the
received wisdom was summarized by a con-
cept known as the Kuznets (1955) curve,
which showed that as income levels rise
inequality ﬁrst increases and then decreases.
However, the existence of an inverted U-
shaped Kuznets curve says nothing directly
about growth and inequality, other than to
argue that as income levels get sufficiently
large, inequality will fall.
Growth-Inequality Regressions
Evidence on the positive link running
from inequality to growth was ﬁrst provided
by Persson and Tabellini (1994), who looked
at cross-sectional and time-series data for both
developing and OECD countries. They found
a signiﬁcant order of magnitude effect of inequal-
ity on growth. The equations were a reduced-
form growth regression with per capita GDP
growth as the dependent variable and con-




Market Income Share Levels 
and Changes, Canada




Three Bottom Deciles 9.6 -0.9
Four Middle Deciles 35.5 -0.5
Top Three Deciles 54.9 1.4
Richard Harris text  11/27/02  2:21 PM  Page 294and schooling. They estimated that a 0.07-
increase in the income share held by the top
20 percent of the population lowered the
growth rate of per capita income by just under
0.5 percent — a very large effect. They argued
that this result also holds for OECD historical
data. Using a 70-country post-war data set,
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) found that a one-
standard-deviation increase in the Gini coef-
ﬁcient of land distribution affects growth rates
by 0.8 percentage points per year. A number
of studies came to similar conclusions,
although it is important to note that the
majority of these studies were done with sam-
ples dominated by developing countries.
16
Very few empirical variables that have
been asserted to explain growth have not gone
unchallenged. The same can be said for
inequality within samples of both OECD and
developing countries. Here are some of the
issues that have been raised in the growth-
inequality context:
> Empirical growth regressions are very sen-
sitive to the set of explanatory variables
used. The signiﬁcance and magnitude of
coefficients often change when the set of
explanatory variables changes. For exam-
ple, most theory suggests that both
investment levels and human capital
should be important conditioning vari-
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BOX 1
Inequality Trends in Canada: An OECD Summary
In Canada, the distribution of disposable incomes remained broadly stable over the last two decades,
and some summary measures point to a slight decrease in inequality. This holds for both the working-
age and the elderly population. During the ﬁrst period, mid-1970s to mid-1980s, there was some "hol-
lowing out" of the middle incomes, as both the bottom and the top incomes gained income shares at
the expense of the middle incomes. This trend did not continue into the second period, from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s. Real incomes, on average, did not improve in Canada over the last 10 years;
they fell for the upper incomes while the real value was maintained for those at the bottom. There was
redistribution across age groups in the last ten years: relative incomes of the elderly, in particular older
senior citizens, increased more than in all other OECD countries (Austria excepted), namely by 3 per-
cent for those aged 55 to 64, by 8 percent for those aged 65 to 74 and by 10 percent for those aged 75
and over. All other age groups lost ground.
As in most other countries, the share of market income, in particular capital and self-employment
income, going to the bottom deciles among those of working-age decreased, and related to that, tax
shares fell, too. At the same time, Canada is one of the few countries in which the transfer share of bot-
tom incomes did not increase during the past ten years. Nevertheless, a decomposition of levels and
trends in inequality among the working-age population shows that both taxes and transfers contributed
to equalize the distribution of disposable incomes over time. As in a majority of countries, a process of
"employment polarisation" took place in Canada in the last ten years. However, both fully employed
and workless households increased their relative incomes while those of multi-adult households with
only one worker fell. The contributions of these three groups to the slight decrease in overall inequali-
ty were different: while inequality within and between those groups contributed largely to the decrease,
structural changes drove overall inequality up but did not outweigh the other decreasing effects.
Source: Förster and Pellizzari (2000, pp. 36-37).
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and speciﬁcally found that when fertility
rates are included in the full sample
(developed and developing countries), the
inequality variable becomes insigniﬁcant.
> One of the major problems in this
debate relates to the inclusion of both
developing and high-income countries
in the data sets. These countries differ
not only in income per capita but also
for a wide range of political and insti-
tutional factors. The convergence liter-
ature on developing countries has come
to the conclusion that there appears to
be evidence of non-convergence, sug-
gesting that these differences are very
persistent. How this should be dealt
with statistically is a major issue.
Purely cross-sectional methods have the
disadvantage of imposing common
parameters on a number of effects that
might be expected to differ between
countries at different levels of develop-
ment. One way around this issue is to
use dynamic panel methods of estima-
tion that attempt to use both time-
series and cross-sectional variation as a
way of identifying the determinants of
growth while controlling for country-
speciﬁc effects.
17 One of the ﬁrst to use
this methodology with respect to the
inequality issue was Forbes (2000), who
found that once country-speciﬁc ﬁxed
effects were included, changes in
inequality either had the opposite effect
on growth rates or were insigniﬁcant.
> Arjona et al. (2001) adopt a panel
approach to look speciﬁcally at this issue
and at the level-of-development issue in
a sample of OECD countries. They use
the transitional version of the Mankiw-
Romer-Weil model, in which growth
depends on population growth, invest-
ment, initial income and human capi-
tal. They ﬁnd virtually no evidence that
inequality affects growth.
> Another major issue is causality. A
standard criticism of much of the cross-
sectional growth literature is that one
can never be certain that correlation is
causation. Usually, there is an attempt
to control for this by using data cover-
ing long periods of growth as well as
conditioning variables measured at the
beginning of the period. More sophis-
ticated studies will often try to esti-
mate a structural model in which the
causal linkages are more precise. There
are a number of different theories link-
ing inequality to growth, and the
transmission channel is quite different
in each case. It is unfortunate that there
have been few attempts to identify the
underlying structural link. For exam-
ple, if increased inequality is assumed
to lower human capital investment it
would be useful to check whether this
structural relationship exists. Perhaps
future work will take this into account,
but at the moment it is a major weak-
ness of the underlying methodology.
18
Should any of this be very surprising?
Hardly, for two reasons. First, it has long
been known that relatively few variables are
robust in growth regressions (see Levine and
Renelt 1992; Sala-i-Martin 1997). Second,
there are the basic data one has to work with.
With a few exceptions, there is not much
variation in inequality across OECD countries
relative to developing countries. The United
States and the United Kingdom tend to have
higher levels of inequality, but their long-
296
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ferent from that of most other industrialized
countries until very recently. The recent surge
in US growth has, if anything, added to the
perception that the causality runs in the other
direction. Chart 1 presents a simple plot of
growth versus average income inequality.
The chart is plotted for the subset of
older OECD countries (it excludes the recent
joiners: Mexico, South Korea, Greece, Spain,
Portugal and Turkey). Not surprisingly,
there is not much to be detected here using
ocular statistical methods. The search for a
more complicated correlation in these data is
largely what the empirical debate has been
about.
On balance, the empirical case for a
link running from growth to inequality for
the high-income countries is at best statisti-
cally fragile and at worst insigniﬁcant. Note
that none of this points to the opposite con-
clusion — that increases in inequality cause
higher economic growth.
The Theoretical Linkages
Often in economics, in the absence of
decisive evidence for or against a hypothesis,
economic theory plays an important role in
determining the priors of economists both as
social scientists and as policy advisers. Part of
the renewed interest in this debate is the new
theoretical literature that shows that increases
in inequality can hurt growth. Most of this the-
ory is rooted in endogenous growth theory,
19 in
which productivity growth is an endogenous
characteristic of the economic system. Recent
surveys that focus on inequality include Aghion
et al. (1999) and Lloyd-Ellis (2000). As it turns
out, however, these theoretical developments,
while insightful, do not establish a strong case.
They provide interesting examples of models
where changes in inequality can lead to lower
growth under highly specialized assumptions.
To obtain these results, one must dramatically
simplify the models themselves. Now, this is
not a criticism. It merely serves to point out
that often, in economics, theory does not sug-
gest a one-sided causal pathway between two
variables. In this particular case, there is also an
older literature that suggests the opposite effect
— higher inequality can raise growth. There is
also a political economy literature that empha-
sizes the endogenous nature of policy and
growth consequences.
A brief summary of the theoretical
arguments is provided below.
Traditional Theory
> Kaldor (1957): With savings-driven
accumulation, and assuming the rich
have a greater propensity to save than
the poor, more inequality leads to
greater savings, which can lead to
higher transitional growth rates.
297
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that capital markets are very imperfect, sig-
niﬁcant individual wealth accumulation
may be necessary to make an invest-
ment. More inequality could help growth
in these circumstances by facilitating the
concentration of large pools of investment
funds.
> Incentive or Mirrlees-type theories
(Mirrlees 1971): With imperfect mon-
itoring of contracts due to transaction
costs, moral hazard is to be expected.
Borrowers using traditional debt con-
tracts are quite likely to behave oppor-
tunistically and not always in the
lenders’ interest. In such cases, optimal
contracts should reward output, and
with heterogeneity among borrowers
the successful would be rewarded, not
the unsuccessful. This implies a need
for ex post inequality in rewards to
maintain incentives. Similar arguments
carry through to the taxation of savings
in endogenous growth models driven
by capital accumulation. Taxing sav-
ings results in lowered growth (Rebelo
1991). Both classes of arguments sug-
gest that increased income inequality,
as opposed to more equality supported
by a highly progressive tax system,
leads to higher growth. 
Political Economy Models
(Persson and Tabellini 1994)
> Inequality affects taxation through the
political process: In unequal societies,
more voters prefer redistribution assum-
ing the median voter determines policy
outcomes. They consequently vote for
redistribution, which reduces the incen-
tives to invest and hence lowers the
growth rate. Note that this argument
assumes that: more inequality ➾ more
redistribution ➾ less growth.
20
> Social protection reduces growth
through rent-seeking: This argument
was made by Lindbeck (1975, 1995),
who looked at the link between growth
and social protection. He suggested that
the universality of Scandinavian welfare
states politicized the returns to econom-
ic activity and thus encouraged people
to seek material gain through the polit-
ical process, by passing redistributive
legislation, rather than through entre-
preneurial and innovative activity.
> A variant on the ﬁrst set of theories, but
with reverse implications, assumes that
interest groups determine policies and
that a strong social safety net exists: In
the presence of a free-rider problem,
interest groups work hard at preventing
policies that hurt them but that other-
wise may have positive, widely diffused
growth effects (e.g., trade liberalization,
labour market reforms). With social
protection, these losses are partially
insured against, thus reducing the oppo-
sition of interest groups to growth-pro-
moting policies and increasing the
likelihood that they will vote in favour
of such measures. 
New Growth Theory
> Imperfect markets and diminishing
returns to investment: Aghion et al.
(1999) refer to this as the opportunity-
enhancing effect of redistribution with
imperfect capital markets. Given the
diminishing returns on individual invest-
ments and restrictions on the ability of
individuals to pool funds, people with
298
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returns on investment, and conversely
for the poor. Redistribution from the
rich to the poor raises the average return
and thus enhances growth.
> Reversal of the traditional incentive argu-
ment: This argument stresses the Mirrlees
case, but with the added assumptions that
the effort of borrowers is related to initial
income and that limited liability effects
are important. Let us assume that the
probability of success of an investment
project depends on the effort of the bor-
rower, but that moral hazard exists for the
usual reasons. With limited liability, indi-
vidual borrowers do not bear the risk of
failure (the lenders lose), and this affects
their effort. If the effort increases the bor-
rowers’ own wealth, then redistribution
towards poor borrowers will have a posi-
tive effect on their effort, thus promoting
growth. Aghion et al. argue that redistri-
bution will increase the effort because it
reduces borrowing by the poor, who now
get a larger share of residual output; with
a larger share, they have an incentive to
work harder.
As is evident, there are a variety of the-
ories suggesting alternative linkages between
inequality and growth. Note that most eco-
nomic theories hinge on one market failure
argument or another, and particularly on
imperfect capital markets. In the case of a
developed country, this would seem to make
sense only in the context of human capital,
given well-developed capital markets for
other forms of investment in physical capi-
tal. If redistribution is to occur, it would
have to be ﬁnanced by distortionary taxes on
wages and savings. This would have the tra-
ditional negative-incentive effects on growth,
which are offset or perhaps overcome by the
opportunity-enhancement effect. However,
it is far from evident that the appropriate
policy to stimulate growth is passive redis-
tribution of income. With inequality of
access to investment across individuals, a
more suitable policy response would be to
either (a) reform ﬁnancial institutions and mar-
kets such that able individuals could invest in
education, or (b) provide more direct support
for public education.
The political economy theories point to
the fact that one must distinguish carefully
between three related factors: inequality, which
can be measured before the tax and transfer sys-
tem apply; redistribution, which is income-based;
and social insurance, which is situation-speciﬁc.
Depending upon the assumptions made, more
market income inequality before taxes and trans-
fers may lead to greater or less redistribution ex
post. Lindbeck views social protection as induc-
ing greater political rent-seeking, whose oppor-
tunity cost is growth; the other view of social
policy is that it provides insurance in a world
with insufficient private markets for insuring risk
against sickness, unemployment and so forth.
Thus, social safety nets (a) promote
individual investments in human capital, and
(b) reduce political opposition to growth-pro-
moting adjustments and policies. Which of
these effects is more important?
In this instance, economic theory points
to interesting hypotheses and provides the
empirical economist, or policy-maker, with
some insight on what road marks to look for
in determining the set of interactions amongst
variables. Beyond that, however, the theories
themselves are too diverse and too malleable
to changes in assumptions or parameter choice
to form a basis for reliable policy formulation
without empirical validation.
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Evidence
It is entirely possible, and theoretically
reasonable, that social policy might affect
growth without greatly affecting income dis-
tribution. For example, many of the theoretical
arguments about the consequences of active-
labour market policies suggest that these could,
in principle, be growth-enhancing. These same
policies might also reduce the degree of mar-
ket-income inequality, but one cannot be cer-
tain of this without carefully specifying the
dynamic feedback effects from growth to
income distribution. It is, however, reasonable
to ask whether one can empirically identify the
linkage between social policy and growth with-
out reference to an intervening effect on
inequality. Unfortunately, very few studies have
been published on this issue, and it is one that
requires further research. There is a fairly well-
developed body of evidence on the effects of
government spending on growth, but it gener-
ally does not distinguish government spending
directed at a social policy objective from spend-
ing directed towards other objectives.
21 A large
number of studies on the growth consequences
of ﬁscal policy have documented a signiﬁcant
and negative effect of government consumption
on growth.
22
One innovative study that attempts to
look speciﬁcally at social policy for OECD
countries is Arjona et al. (2001, 2002). The
authors use a framework similar to that dis-
cussed in the second section of the present
paper to infer the impact of social expenditures
on growth in OECD countries. The growth
equation is a Mankiw-Romer-Weil transition-
al one that controls for investment and human
capital intensity across countries, and is esti-
mated using an annual sample of 21 OECD
countries over the period 1970-88. The authors
ﬁnd virtually no evidence that post-tax-transfer
inequality affects growth rates in OECD coun-
tries. There is some evidence that total gov-
ernment spending on social programs reduces
growth. The magnitude of the effects is conse-
quential. In the basic model, with aggregate
social expenditure as a fraction of GDP, the
coefficient is -0.134. This compares with a
coefficient on the investment share of 0.345.
Both are signiﬁcant at the 95-percent level.
23
Quantitatively, the implication is that if one
were to decrease social spending by 1.0 percent
of GDP and increase investment by 1.0 per-
cent of GDP, the impact on aggregate labour-
productivity growth would be on the order of
0.5 percent per year. Not a large impact, but
over a number of years it would begin to have
a signiﬁcant effect on income levels. Recall
that until recently annual labour-productivi-
ty growth was in the area of 1.5 percent.
The authors do ﬁnd, however, that when
social spending is disaggregated by function
the results are cleaner in terms of both signiﬁ-
cance and magnitude. Passive social spending
is prejudicial to growth, while active social
spending promotes growth. Interestingly, they
also ﬁnd that when the deﬁnition of active
social spending is expanded to include health
expenditures, the coefficient estimates on social
spending become insigniﬁcant. When they
include both passive and active social spend-
ing as explanatory variables the coefficient on
passive social spending is signiﬁcant and neg-
ative, while the coefficient on active social
spending is signiﬁcant and positive. The orders
of magnitude are interesting. The coefficient
estimates imply that a shift of 1.0 percent of
GDP from passive to active spending produces
a positive effect on growth of about 0.5 per-
cent. Overall, the results suggest that social
expenditures that promote adjustment and
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labour-productivity growth, while other forms
of social expenditures do not contribute to
growth and in fact may reduce it.
Obviously, one should interpret these
results with caution, given the limited time-
series variation in the data and other poten-
tially omitted variables in the growth equation
such as R&D and openness. Nevertheless, this
is a good start on an important research and
policy issue.
An alternative and in many ways unre-
lated body of evidence links social capital to
economic growth. Social capital as deﬁned by
Putnam (1993) and Woolcock (1998) refers
to the nature of trust in societies engendered
by various forms of community association.
One of the best known and most representa-
tive deﬁnitions can be found in the highly
inﬂuential work of Putnam (1993):
Social capital…refers to features of social
organisation, such as trust, norms, and net-
works, that can improve the efficiency of socie-
ty by facilitating co-ordinated actions. (167)
To an economist, as Arrow pointed out long
ago, trust is an important substitute for mar-
kets and contracts. A priori, one would imag-
ine that more trust would imply higher
growth. The issue is pertinent to the debate
on social policy because there is a strong pre-
sumption that social cohesion and social cap-
ital are closely related, as argued by Ritzen
et al. (2000). A major objective of social pol-
icy is the creation of social cohesion. These
authors argue that social cohesion creates an
environment in which good policy is possi-
ble if policy-makers are given room to
manoeuvre. The latter is created by reducing
societal conﬂict over distributional objectives,
in part through common institutions such as
social policy.
However, the empirical evidence on
social trust and growth is simply non-existent,
so there seems to be little point in continuing
in this vein. What evidence exists from cross-
country comparisons based on the World Values
Survey seems to show that a higher index of trust
actually leads to lower growth rates (see, e.g.,
Knack and Keefer 1997). When Knack and
Keefer exclude socialist countries and focus on a
more recent period (1980-92), they get stronger
results. Controlling for initial income per head,
human capital and the relative price of invest-
ment goods, an increase of 10 percentage points
in the level of their trust index (slightly less than
one standard deviation) is associated with an
annual growth rate higher by 0.8 percentage
points. Typically, the results are weaker when
attention is restricted to a sample of OECD
countries. Also using World Values Survey
data, Helliwell (1996) found that trust has a
negative effect on growth in a sample of 17
OECD countries. Knack (2000) reports that in
a sample of 25 OECD countries the impact of
trust is imprecisely measured, and the hypoth-
esis that it has no effect cannot be rejected at
conventional signiﬁcance levels. This literature
may prove to be inﬂuential at a future date, but
thus far there is little in it that could be used as
a major justiﬁcation for policy.
CONCLUSION
The linkages between economic growth
and productivity are both complex and sub-
ject to a variety of potential causal mecha-
nisms. This paper has reviewed the evidence
and theory linking the social determinants of
productivity growth, which include such fac-
tors as the distribution of income and wealth
in society; the set of social policies existing in
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redistributive programs and the education and
health systems; and the degree of social cohe-
sion. The complexity in uncovering a link
running from social factors to productivity
growth is compounded by the fact that these
broad institutional arrangements, including
the social determinants but also the political
and legal systems, may have indirect effects in
the long run that are difficult if not impossible
to detect in conventional economic data. In
spite of these problems, there is a new body of
research, both theoretical and empirical, that
attempts to identify the relationship among
social policies, economic inequalities and pro-
ductivity growth.
The traditional economic debate on these
matters was usually framed in terms of the
equity-efficiency tradeoff, in which more eco-
nomic growth could be achieved only at the
expense of increased economic inequality. The
newer literature suggests that, in fact, growth
and social objectives may be complements
rather than substitutes. This certainly provides
a more optimistic view of the choices facing
governments than has been the case based on
the existence of a growth-equity tradeoff.
While these recent empirical and theo-
retical contributions are interesting and sug-
gest some important new areas for research, it
is premature to assume that this literature
proves the existence of a robust linkage run-
ning from social policy and inequality to pro-
ductivity growth. One cannot conclude that
reduced income inequality leads to increased
productivity growth or that more social
spending leads to increased productivity
growth. The empirical evidence establishing
such a linkage, which at this point is largely
based on macroeconomic cross-country com-
parisons, either is simply not in the data or is
statistically fragile. Moreover, much of what
has been offered as evidence in favour of this
hypothesis rests on developing-country data,
which are of questionable relevance to an
advanced industrialized country like Canada.
It is important to emphasize the recent ori-
gins of this research. Virtually all of it has
been done in the last 10 years, and the total
number of studies is still quite limited. It is
possible, therefore, that our views based on
the weight of evidence will change in the next
few years. The one major exception to these
observations concerns education. There is a
very large body of evidence showing that
increasing education has a substantial effect
on productivity. The role of human capital in
Canada’s economic growth has been an endur-
ing theme of both social policy and econom-
ic policy. The evidence surveyed in Harris
(2002) provides a strong endorsement of this
view. The evidence on health expenditures is
less convincing, but in general the produc-
tivity case for improving human capital is
compelling and warrants further research.
In summary, the major conclusion of
this paper is as follows:
> The general case linking social policies
or inequality to productivity growth
remains unproven. Justiﬁcation for any
particular social policy innovation must
rest on its cost-effectiveness in reaching
its stated social goals. What little evidence
we have suggests that social policies pro-
moting labour market participation, rather
than passive cash-transfer programs, are
most likely to generate productivity ben-
eﬁts, although the magnitude of the
effects remains uncertain. A great deal
more research is necessary to link social
policies to productivity, particularly at
the micro level, before a productivity
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particular social policy.
To this can be added the further con-
clusions of Harris (2002):
> Policies that have been proven to most
likely increase productivity are those
focused on the proximate economic
levers to productivity growth — those
that stimulate investment, innovation
and competition, and facilitate the
international diffusion of knowledge.
> The one social policy for which there is
ample evidence of positive productivity
effects is education. A substantial portion
of Canada’s economic growth appears to
be attributable to the country’s high lev-
els of educational attainment.
> The “new economy” perspective provides
a coherent explanation of both recent
growth and inequality trends as endoge-
nous reactions to a common cause — the
acceleration of technological change. The
growing evidence linking both recent and
past productivity data, together with evi-
dence on wage inequality trends in indus-
trial countries, provides a more coherent
perspective from which to assess policies
linking productivity and inequality. A
growth-oriented policy must both pro-
mote technological adaptation through
investment and skills acquisition, and
facilitate the required structural change
across regions, industries, ﬁrms and work-
ers. Social policy can facilitate these
adjustments by providing the least well-
off with the resources to make the
required investments in human capital
both for themselves and for their children.
The major rationale underlying social
policies in the modern mixed economy has
never been higher productivity growth. The
general concerns for social justice and the
political demands of an increasingly wealthy
society for improved education, health and
social insurance have long been the major
reasons why voters have requested these poli-
cies in Canada. This will undoubtedly con-
tinue to be true provided economic growth
is sustained. Failure to increase or keep pace
with living standards in other advanced
countries is ultimately the greatest threat to
Canada’s social programs. In that sense, pro-
ductivity issues and social policy will always
be linked.
NOTES
This article is an abridged version of Harris (2002),
published with the permission of Industry Canada.
1 For a recent review of these arguments from a
Canadian perspective, see Osberg (1995).
2 Krugman (1994) provides a very readable statement
of this argument.
3 Also referred to as endogenous growth theory.
Surveys of this ﬁeld are presented in Aghion and
Howitt (1998) and Jones (1999).
4 Harris (2002) contrasts the social determinants of
productivity with more conventional economic
determinants, such as investment and innovation, by
examining two speciﬁc social policies — education
and health — and the literature on major
technological change, wage inequality and the new
economy.
5 On aging and social security reform, see OECD (1998).
The literature subsequent to the OECD Jobs Study is
voluminous. A review is provided by Disney (2000).
6 This section draws on material in Harris (1999).
7 For a brief and non-technical review of productivity
measurement, see Harris (1999). For an extensive
review of the literature and a history of the subject,
see Hulten (2000).
8 In the Canadian data, the majority of productivity
growth is accounted for by TFP growth or
multifactor productivity (MFP) growth. MFP growth
data are published regularly by Statistics Canada.
9 A good example is Mokyr (1990).
10 For a recent survey, see Ritzen et al. (2000).
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somewhat more successful, although this result has
been criticized on a number of fronts.
12 These models almost always ignore adjustment costs,
which is a serious problem in using them for welfare
evaluations. With high adjustment costs, fast
convergence is not always a good thing.
13 These are covered in greater detail in the section “The
Human Capital Dimension of Growth” in Harris (2002).
14 An increase in the Gini coefficient corresponds to an
increase in inequality.
15 Beach and Slotsve (1996) document these trends for
Canada.
16 A survey of this literature is provided in Benabou (1996).
17 Contributions to the analysis of growth using panel
data sets and ﬁxed-effects estimation include Barro
and Lee (1994) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
18 An exception is Perotti (1996), who looks at the
effect of inequality on female education and fertility
for developing countries and ﬁnds a signiﬁcant effect.
This suggests that it may be the important causal
channel in developing country data.
19 For a comprehensive survey, see Aghion and Howitt (1998).
20 Aghion et al. (1999) claim that this is inconsistent
with evidence showing that redistribution has a
positive effect on growth and that measures of
redistribution are uncorrelated with inequality —
they cite Perotti (1994), whose Tables 4 and 8 report
regression results. The measure of redistribution is
the marginal tax rate.
21 There are a few older studies that claim to focus on the links
between social expenditure and growth. Unfortunately,
they rely on the cross-sectional approach and most suffer
from data deﬁciencies. Results have generally been mixed,
but most come to the conclusion that social expenditure is
bad for growth. See, for example, Landau (1985), Gwartney
et al. (1998), Hansson and Henrekson (1994), Lindert
(1996) and Weede (1986, 1991).
22 This is the literature on ﬁscal policy and growth. A
modern example is Easterly and Rebelo (1993).
Temple (1999) covers the evidence in his survey.
23 Results reported in Table 6.4, column 2, of Arjona et
al. (2001).
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